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This paper tests for the existence of market power in banking, using data on 
demand deposit rates of households and corresponding market rates in five euro 
area countries. An implicit measure for market power is based on a partial 
adjustment model that also allows for an asymmetric response of deposit rates to 
changes in market rates. The period covers the ten years since introduction of the 
euro. The analysis indicates that banks are exercising major market power within 
the euro area. In addition to general sluggishness, bank deposit rates’ reactions are 
clearly asymmetric: flexible when market rates are decreasing and rigid when 
rates are increasing. The degree of asymmetric behaviour can be interpreted as a 
further indication of the market power banks exercise. Despite country 
differences, a general pattern of interest rate adjustment in demand deposit pricing 
is observable. 
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Markkinavoiman mittaaminen pankkien 
talletuskoroista euroalueella 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 27/2009 
Laura Vajanne 




Tässä työssä testataan pankkien markkinavoimaa viidessä euromaassa markkina-
korkojen ja kotitalouksien käyttelytilien talletuskorkojen välisten reaktioiden 
avulla. Markkinavoimaa mitataan implisiittisellä mittarilla, jossa talletuskorkojen 
oletetaan sopeutuvan markkinakorkojen muutoksiin osittaisen sopeutumisen mal-
lin mukaisesti. Mallissa sallitaan myös talletuskorkojen epäsymmetrinen sopeutu-
minen markkinakorkojen muutokseen. Tutkimusperiodi alkaa tammikuusta 1999 
ja ulottuu maaliskuuhun 2009. Tulosten mukaan euroalueen pankkien talletusten 
hinnoittelussa on löydettävissä yhtenäisiä piirteitä huolimatta pankkitoiminnan 
eroavaisuuksista maiden välillä. Pankeilla on ollut huomattavasti markkinavoimaa 
hinnoitellessaan talletuksia. Talletuskorot reagoivat niukasti markkinakorkojen 
muutoksiin, ja lisäksi talletuskorkojen reaktiot ovat selvästi asymmetrisiä. 
Talletuskorot joustavat enemmän markkinakorkojen laskiessa kuin niiden nous-
tessa. Asymmetria voidaan tulkita lisäevidenssiksi pankkien markkinavoimasta. 
 
Avainsanat: kilpailu, pankkitoimiala, vähittäispankkikorot 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, L11, L13  
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The aim of this paper is to propose a straightforward measure for assessing market 
power in banking by means of a model in which demand deposit rates are 
modelled as a function of corresponding market rates. Deposit pricing is one of 
the core businesses of banking having a direct effect on banks’ profitability. 
Compared to pricing loans, the competition effect should be more pronounced for 
deposits as they are less affected by risk factors and other informational 
imperfections such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Concentrating only on the demand deposit pricing confines the bank’s 
optimization problem which varies depending on the maturity of its liabilities. 
  The model is based on the paper by Hutchison and Pennachi (1996). The 
authors presented a deposit pricing model where retail deposit rates are modelled 
as a function of corresponding market rates and where the response of deposit 
rates to changes in market rates describes the market power of banks. If the 
markets were perfectly competitive banks’ retail rate adjustment would be 
complete and retail rates would follow market rates without any delay. When the 
competition is imperfect, the response of retail rates describes the pricing power 
banks have when setting their interest rates. This basic model is enlarged allowing 
asymmetric responses of retail deposit rates which seem, by and large, to improve 
the results of the basic model. 
  The measurement of competition in banking is of considerable policy 
relevance. A competitive banking sector is a highly important element in the 
financial system in general and especially in the euro area where the financial 
structure is to a large extent bank centred. A more competitive banking market is 
expected to drive down bank loan rates and to give a fair compensation to 
depositors, thereby adding to the welfare of households and enterprises. The 
monetary policy transmission also depends crucially on the intensity of 
competition in banking markets. Less competition might indicate a sluggish and 
rigid pass through of the official rate changes to retail interest rates thus 
mitigating the expected effect of the change in the monetary policy. The recent 
financial crisis has also stressed the need for a proper competition measure in 
banking. Particularly the trade-off among competition and financial stability is a 
highly relevant issue currently under discussion. 
  The results of research assessing banking competition in the euro area have 
shown to be ambiguous when answering the question of competition intensity. 
Different measures tell us different stories about the trends and developments of 
competition. Competition measures are complex to estimate and difficult to 
interpret. Carbo et al (2009) demonstrate in their recent study for a cross-section 
of 14 European countries over the period 1995–2001, that the comparison of 
indicators often gives conflicting predictions of competitive behaviour across  
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countries, within countries, and over time. The usual measures are only weakly 
positively related to one another. Hence it is a challenge to search for an indicator 
to answer questions such as how intense competition in banking in monetary 
union member countries can be or whether the creation of the monetary union 
possibly changed the competitive position in banking among the countries. 
  A pass-through from market rates to retail banking rates has rarely been used 
to investigate the degree of competition or imperfection in the banking market. 
Traditionally the pass-through analysis concentrates to investigate the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, where the transmission from monetary policy rate 
onto lending and deposit rates is considered.
1 Empirical results from previous 
studies show that retail interest rates tend to adjust slowly and less completely to 
changes in competitive market interest rates. In addition, responses seem to be 
asymmetric eg deposit rates are displaying rigidity when market rates increase but 
flexibility when market rates decrease. Available evidence for the euro area 
banking sector also suggests that there are significant differences across the 
countries in the way banks adjust their interest rates in reaction to changes in 
corresponding market rates; both as regards the long-term multipliers and the 
speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium. 
  This paper presents a test for market power utilizing a partial adjustment 
model. The sensitivity of demand deposit rates to changes in market rates is used 
as an indicator for the level of competition. The hypothesis tested is the following: 
the less flexible deposit rates the more market power banks are exercising. To be 
able to construct this type of an indicator and perform comparisons across the 
countries there are necessary assumptions the underlying circumstances must 
fulfil. Firstly, market rates should represent the cost of banks’ refinancing and in 
competitive markets changes in costs are reflected in banks’ deposit pricing. 
Within the euro area, the common currency and single monetary policy guarantee 
that banks face a common wholesale interest rate, which can be assumed to 
represent the opportunity cost for refinancing. The interbank markets are also 
exogenous when seen from the banks’ viewpoint.
2 Secondly, there must be a 
sufficiently similar regulatory and operational framework for banking to facilitate 
the comparisons. In Europe there have been noteworthy differences in the 
regulatory framework regarding banking deposits (eg taxation practices) but the 
significance of these regulatory measures has been declining over time. During 
the last ten years, banks have already been facing a widely harmonised 
supervisory and regulatory environment within the monetary union. 
                                                 
1 Empirical literature of the pass-through is very rich, see eg van Leuvensteijn et al (2008) and the 
references therein. Closely related to this strand of literature is research where the link between 
bank interest rate margins and the market structure of the banking system is investigated eg 
Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992). 
2 The existence of the interbank markets allows us also to assume that lending rates and deposit 
rates are priced independently.  
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  In addition, we have to assume that the demand deposit interest rates stand for 
sufficiently harmonised banking products in order to be comparable across the 
countries. Using data on overnight deposit accounts for households collected by 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) should fulfil this condition. The 
content of these accounts can be assumed to include the same kind of services 
across the countries. Demand deposit accounts generally include the possibility to 
use a payment card, an electronic access to the account and an opportunity to pay 
bills from the account. Thus even if banks offer highly differentiated products to 
their customers and bundle their services, the content of demand deposit accounts 
seems to be a highly homogeneous product across the euro area. The most 
relevant feature – to withdraw deposits without any termination clause – is by 
definition a common feature for the demand deposits category. 
  The contributions of this paper are the following. First, a straightforward 
approach for assessing banking competition is proposed. Second, the above-
mentioned highly homogeneous deposit interest rates of a well defined banking 
product over the whole period of the euro are used. The ESCB harmonised 
interest rate data collection from Monetary Financial Institutions did not start until 
2003, but an historical data series going back to 1999 is available for some of the 
euro countries being tested here. Third, in this study changes in the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) refinancing interest rate defining the stance of the monetary 
policy are used to describe the movements of the short term market rates. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes a test of competition 
making use of a partial adjustment model. A profit maximizing bank facing a less 
than perfectly elastic demand for its deposits is assumed. An optimal retail interest 
rate is derived as a function of the competitive market rate. The theoretical model 
is estimated in a discrete time form allowing the possibility of retail rates to an 
asymmetric adjustment of changes in market rates. Section 3 describes the data 
used in the study. It consists of monthly data for households’ overnight deposit 
interest rates for the period 1999/01 to 2009/03, collected from monetary financial 
institutes of five euro area member countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy 
and Spain) plus the euro area as a whole. In section 4 the model is estimated and 





2  Inferring market power from retail deposits 
interest rates 
Traditional models in finance usually assume that prices of financial assets and 
liabilities are set in perfectly competitive markets. Perfect competition would 
indicate that banks were price takers and a profit-maximizing bank would adjust 
its volume of loans and deposits such a way that it would pay an interest rate on 
deposits equal to the marginal cost of capital, less any cost of doing business; and 
borrowers would pay for loans the same cost of capital plus a compensation for 
credit risk and marginal operating costs. Changes in marginal costs would be 
converted entirely to retail prices. 
  This competitive market paradigm is, however, less defensible for many 
financial instruments. Significant market power can exists particularly in retail 
financial markets. As empirical evidence indicates, retail deposit rates tend to be 
lower, and adjust more slowly and less completely to changes in competitive 
market interest rates. Consequently, theoretical models in banking usually assume 
an imperfect competition, often within an oligopolistic or monopolistic framework 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In these models, competitors face linear downward 
sloping demand functions and retail rates are set as a mark-up over the original 
(opportunity) cost of funds. If banks exercise some market power the decision of a 
bank to adjust its deposit rate to a change in corresponding capital market rate 
depends positively on the interest rate elasticity of the deposit supply curve faced 
by an individual bank.
3 This elasticity is in turn a positive function of the degree 
of competition in the deposit market. 
  A wide range of factors maintain the market power in banking. Entry into the 
banking sector is restricted by regulatory agencies, creating one of the 
preconditions for a degree of monopoly power and administrated pricing. Market 
power and an inelastic demand for retail bank products may also result from the 
existence of switching costs and asymmetric information costs. Switching costs 
may arise when bank customers consider switching from one bank to another, for 
example when a household intend to transfer its savings deposits from bank A to 
bank B. Costs of acquiring information and search and administrative costs are 
potentially important in markets where significant information or transaction costs 
exist. The costs are also expected to be high in markets with long-term 
relationships and repeated transactions (Sharpe, 1997). Generally the existence of 
switching costs results in market segmentation and reduces the demand elasticity 
(Klemperer, 1987). Moreover, even in the presence of small switching costs, the 
theory predicts that the smaller the proportion of customers that are ‘new’ to the 
                                                 
3 Also other factors than competition affect to the response of retail bank rates to changes in 
market rates like costs associated with adjusting retail rates.  
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market, the less competitive prices will be. Thus, even with non-co-operative 
behaviour, switching costs result in a retail bank interest rate adjustment of less 
than one to a change in the market interest rate (Lowe and Rohling, 1992). 
  A relevant question regarding the responses of deposit rates to changes in 
market rates is whether the responses are likely to be asymmetric with respect to 
increase and decreases in the market rates. The presence of the asymmetry is well 
documented in many empirical researches considering deposit rates responses to 
market interest rates.
4 The general finding is that deposit rates are slower to 
increase when market rates are mounting than they are to decrease when market 
rates fall ie there is positive asymmetry. 
  Asymmetric pricing has been documented in several other sectors, as well as 
in banking. Gasoline prices respond more quickly to crude oil price increases than 
decreases (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997). Lach and Moraga-Gonzáles 
(2009) examine asymmetric price effects of competition using data on gasoline 
prices. They found that as competition increases, the distribution of prices spreads 
out: the low prices go down while the high prices go up. As a result, competition 
has an asymmetric effect on prices. These findings are consistent with a 
theoretical model where consumers differ in the information they have about 
prices. In producer and consumer goods Peltzman (2000) finds that the prices of 
more than two-thirds of these products rises more quickly in response to input 
cost increases than they decline in response to input decreases. This leads 
Peltzman to the strong conclusion that the standard economic theory of markets is 
wrong, because it does not predict or explain the prevalence of asymmetric price 
adjustment.
5 
  The asymmetry in deposit pricing is commonly linked to the market power 
and lack of competition since profit maximizing behaviour forces firms in 
competitive markets to adjust their prices to new cost conditions immediately and 
presumably symmetrically. This hold when frictions and imperfections are absent. 
If the intensity of competition in the market for deposits is rather low and banks 
have market power in their pricing, they might be slower to adjust deposit rates 
upwards in order to increase average profits over the interest rate cycle. The fact 
that banks are delaying changes that would shrink their profits refers to 
oligopolistic structures of banking. Banks may expect their competitors to be 
more likely to follow rate reductions than increases, especially if mistaken for 
attempts at gaining market share. Moreover, in the presence of collusive 
                                                 
4 In US banking Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Mester and Saunders 
(1995) and Kahn, Pennacchi and Sopranzetti (2000); Scholnick (1996, 1999) in Malaysian, 
Singaporean and Canadian banks; Hofmann and Mizen (2001), Heffernan (2007) for UK banks; 
Sander and Kleimeier(2002, 2004) and Gropp et al (2007) for euro area banks. 
5 See also a comprehensive survey of asymmetric price transmission by von Cramon-Taubadel and 
Meyer (2004).  
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arrangements, the risk of triggering a price war through rate increases may make 
upward revisions inherently costly.
6 
  The possible existence of asymmetric price transmission is of considerable 
importance. It could have important welfare and, hence, policy implications. It 
implies that in the case of banking depositors do not benefit from a market interest 
rate rise that would, under conditions of symmetry, have taken place sooner 
and/or have been of a greater magnitude than observed. Thus it implies a different 
distribution of welfare than would be obtained under symmetry, because it alters 
the timing and/or the size of the welfare changes that are associated with price 
changes. 
  As a summary from the discussion above, we need to take into account at 
least following points when estimating the response of retail bank deposit rates to 
changes in corresponding market rates: 
 
(i)  Banks are price setters for deposits: imperfect competition in markets. 
(ii)  Banks are price takers in wholesale markets. 
(iii) Deposit interest rates are adjusting only partially to changes in 
corresponding market rates. 
(iv)  Responses of the deposit rates might be asymmetric to increases and 
decreases in market rates. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical  model 
This section presents a simple model where the aforementioned features of setting 
deposit interest by a bank are taken into account. The model is based on a seminal 
paper by Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), where they model retail interest rates 
in order to measure rents and interest rate risk of banks in imperfect financial 
markets. The model has been evolved later in eg O’Brien (2000) and Dewachter, 
Lyrio and Maes (2006). 
  The market for retail deposits is modelled by Hutchison and Pennacchi as 
having a downward sloping demand curve that is a function of deposit interest 
rate, the competitive market interest rate and other market variables. Individual 
banks are assumed to set their equilibrium prices and quantities so as to maximize 
                                                 
6 The oligopolistic behaviour where rivals will quickly match price reductions but only hesitantly 
and incompletely (if at all) follow price increases is the basis for kinked demand curve. This 
pattern of expected behaviour produces a kink at the existing price in the demand curve for the 
product of an oligopolist, and the corresponding marginal revenue curve will possess a 
discontinuity the length of which is proportional to the difference between the slopes of the upper 
and lower segments of the demand curve at the kink. Thus, if the marginal cost curve passes 
between the two parts of the marginal revenue curve, the fluctuations in marginal cost are not 
likely to affect output and prices ie for small changes in marginal costs, prices do not move; for 
larger changes, adjustment is stickier in the upward direction. See Stigler (1947).  
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profit based on considerations and the degree of competition in the market. The 
degree of competition in the market on the other hand is determined by demand 
conditions and characteristics of interaction between firms. 
  Banks take savings in the form of deposits and subsequently lend them out for 
investments, and an efficient market would imply that the interest paid to deposit 
holders at time t rd(t) would equal the marginal cost of capital r(t), less the 
transaction costs c(t). If the bank’s marginal revenue from investing its deposits 
equals the market interest rate we can solve the optimal interest rate  ) t ( r
*
d  as a 
function the competitive rate and other exogenous variables. 
  The solution to the problem is the following 
 
) r / D /( D ) t ( c ) t ( r ) t ( r d
*
d ∂ ∂ − − =  (2.1) 
 
If a bank’s retail deposit market is perfectly competitive, ∂D/∂rd = ∞ and thus rd(t) 
would equal the competitive rate r(t)–c(t). A less than perfectly elastic demand for 
deposits implies a deposit interest rate that is below r(t)–c(t). The smaller the 
elasticity, the greater is the market power of the bank on deposit. 
  To generate an equilibrium process for the bank’s optimal deposit interest rate 
the form of the bank’s demand function and the processes for the competitive 
market rate must be specified. Consistent with the equilibrium results in 
Hutchison (1995), Hutchison and Pennacchi assume that the inverse demand 
elasticity D/(∂D/∂rd) is a linear function of the market rate. This results to the 
bank’s optimal retail deposit interest rate having the simple linear form 
 
) t ( e ) t ( r d d r 1 0
*
d + + =  (2.2) 
 
 
2.2 Empirical  implementation 
It is not at all clear in which form the theoretical model should be estimated. 
Perhaps the simplest way of estimating eq. (2.2) is to use a partial adjustment 
mechanism of the form 
 
] r r [ b r r 1 dt
*
d 1 dt dt − − − = −  (2.3) 
 
Substituting eq. (2.2) into (2.3) and rewriting it we get the standard partial 
adjustment model 
 
t 1 dt t dt r r r ε + γ + β + α = −  (2.4) 
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The coefficient α is a constant mark up – actually ‘mark down’ in the case of 
deposits – on marginal costs while the size of the parameter β depends on the 
demand elasticity for deposits, and ε is the error term. 
  This type of partial adjustment model is a practical way to represent deposit 
rate stickiness such that the model dynamics are estimable and tractable. The 
marginal cost facing banks is assumed to be the corresponding money market rate, 
as this could be a proxy for bank’s cost of funding being directed to a segment 
concerned. If banks were operating effectively in a perfect competition, the 
response to a change in market rates would be direct and there would be a 
complete pass-through of adjustment in money market rates to subsequent 
changes in a bank’s retail rates; β would get a value close to unity. Retail bank 
interest rates in less competitive or oligopolistic segments of the retail bank 
market adjust incompletely and only with a delay; β gets a value less than unity 
and the smaller is the response of a change of market rate to deposit rate, the 
greater is the market power of a bank. When the intensity of competition 
increases, bank interest rate becomes more sensitive to changes in market rates. 
An imperfect pass-through can be viewed as a result of imperfect competition.
7 
  The equation will be estimated in differenced form 
 
' r ' r ' ' r t 1 dt t dt ε + Δ γ + Δ β + α = Δ −  (2.5) 
 
where  1 t t t' − ε − ε = ε  and the constant  ' α  is included to take the possible trend 
effect from eq. (2.4) into account. 
  As a diagnostic check on the model specification I have used a differencing 
test proposed by Davidson, Godfrey and Mackinnon (1985) which is a simplified 
version from the test proposed by Plosser, Schwert and White (1982). Testing 
results point to marginal problems in a couple of cases.
8 One way out of the 
problems is to add some additional variables or to use an alternative functional 
form in estimation. Thus, as implicit in the model above was the assumption that 
the response of deposit rates to market rates is symmetric; that is, the response 
does not depend upon whether market rates are moving upwards or downwards, 
                                                 
7 A low estimate of β for the average bank should be interpreted, however, with care. A low 
estimate of β necessarily implies is that a bank’s current period deposit rate has a relatively high 
correlation with its previous period deposit rate, compared with its correlation with the current 
month’s market rate. This may reflect expectations of mean reverting market interest rates, costs of 
adjusting prices, or even the possibility that the market rate is a noisy measure of marginal 
opportunity cost. See Neumark and Sharpe (1992). 
8 The differencing test gives a warning of misspecification in the case of Finland and in the euro 
area as a whole. Values of the F-test were 4.41 with probability of 0.014 and 3.60 with probability 
0.030 respectively. Other four cases passed the test. Typically specification errors include omitted 
variables, measurement errors or simultaneous equation problems.  
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we try next to capture explicitly asymmetry in rising versus declining market rates 
by modifying equation (2.5) to a non-linear adjustment model.
9 
  Allowing the asymmetric reaction of deposit rates to changes in market rates, 





t 2 t 1
*
dt r r 2 D r 1 D r ε + Δ γ + Δ β + Δ β + α = Δ −  (2.6) 
 
where 
D1 = 1, D2 = 0 when ECB’s refinancing rate is decreasing or stable 
D1 = 0, D2 = 1 when ECB’s refinancing rate is increasing. 
 
This type of a model can be seen as a special case of the smooth transition 
regression models which are belonging to a larger group of regime-switching 
models (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993). The regime in our case is defined by the 
monetary policy stance (easing or tightening) and thus any kind of smoothing or 
non-zero threshold does not seem necessary. The model reduces to a standard 
partial adjustment form under symmetric adjustment. As the emphasis of this 
study is in the price sensitiveness we pay less attention to the possible non-
linearity of the adjustment speed towards the long run equilibrium which is the 
framework commonly used in non-linear error correction models.
10 
  Equation (2.6) is compared to eq. (2.5). If the price responses are asymmetric 
β1 ≠ β2, and if deposit interest rates respond stronger when market rates are 
decreasing compared to increasing market rates β1 > β2. Positive asymmetry 
means that banks are slower to adjust deposit rates upwards (β2) in order to 
increase average profits over the interest rate cycle than vice verse. On the other 
hand, if the markets are very competitive, banks might be more reluctant to adjust 
deposit rates downwards in order to avoid loss of customers. The behaviour refers 
to oligopolistic structures of banking and to the market power banks exercise. 
 
 
                                                 
9 There could be also possibilities to use functional forms not explicit on asymmetry but more 
flexible than the standard (symmetric) partial adjustment model or those recognize higher-order or 
more complex lag dependencies on market rates like in Jarrow and van Deventer (1998) or in 
Hawkins and Arnold (2000). 
10 Sanders and Kleimeier (2004) estimate five asymmetric specifications for the adjustment of 
interest rates in the error correction framework. They allow different smoothing processes and 
thresholds.  
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3 The  data 
The analysis is based on overnight deposit rates for households as defined by the 
ESCB in the interest rate data collection for Monetary and Financial Institutions. 
Overnight deposits include all transaction account deposits, overnight debt 
instruments and overnight money market deposits without any agreed fixed terms 
to maturity. 
  The overnight deposits cover around one third of households’ deposits in the 
euro area. The other main categories are deposits redeemable at notice and 
deposits with agreed fixed term to maturity. The harmonised data collection 
started in Eurosystem in January 2003, but for some euro area countries central 
banks have compiled historical series backwards. We have had the possibility to 
use in estimations data from 1999 onwards for Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy 
and Spain plus the euro area as a whole. 
  One month Euribor is used as a competitive market rate. It has been chosen 
because it correlates closely with overnight deposit rates indicating the role of 
corresponding competitive market rate. The developments of the interest rates are 
shown in Figure 3.1. The overnight deposit rates are clearly below the market 
rates. The levels of the overnight interest rates vary across the countries, on the 
average the highest deposit rates have been paid in Germany and the lowest in 
Finland. The spread between Euribor and overnight deposit rate has been in the 
whole euro area slightly more than 220 bps. Also the sluggishness of deposit rates 
is clearly observable. The standard deviation of the overnight deposit rates is only 
around one third of Euribor’s standard deviation. 
 
Figure 3.1  Overnight deposit interest rates and 




Differences in interest rate levels across the euro countries are still likely to reflect 
the same product heterogeneity, differences in market practices and in fiscal 
framework. However, it seem to be a common practice all over the euro area that 
banks remunerate overnight deposits at low interest rates and in return charge low 
fees for transaction services (money transfer, credit card, internet banking). Nor 
might the relevance of differences in fiscal framework eg exemption from 
withholding tax, be very significant in overnight deposits compared to deposits 
with longer maturity.
11 The relative differences between interest rate levels seem 
in any case to have remained rather stable during the last ten years, which 
indicates that the differences in interest rate levels don’t have an impact to the 
estimation results. 
  Changes in the ECB’s refinancing interest rate are chosen to describe the 
changes in market rates regime. The changes in the ECB’s refinancing rate are 
shown in Figure 3.2. The changes in the Eurosystem monetary policy have been 
outspoken and consistent signalling the stance of the monetary policy during the 
last ten years. Thus choosing to use the policy rate as an indicator for increasing 
or decreasing interest rate regime instead of changes in Euribor rates removes 
randomness and noise which are characteristic of changes in short term market 
rates. 
 














                                                 
11 Sometimes these average spreads are used as a measure for competition but for the reasons 
mentioned they might misleading More detailed analysis of differences in MFI interest rates across 
the euro area countries can be found in the ECB (2006).  
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4 Estimation  results 
As a summary, the estimated models, used symbols and their operational 
counterparts are following 
 
' r ' r ' ' r t d t d ) 1 t ( i ) t ( i ε + Δ γ + Δ β + α = Δ
−  (4.1) 
 
' r r 2 D r 1 D r t d
*
t 2 t 1
*
d ) 1 t ( i ) t ( i ε + Δ γ + Δ β + Δ β + α = Δ
−  (4.2) 
 
) t ( i d r  is the overnight deposit rate in country i, Δ is the difference operator, rt one-
month Euribor, α takes the possible trend effect into account while the size of the 
parameter β depends on the demand elasticity for deposits. D1 = 1, D2 = 0 when 
ECB’s refinancing rate is decreasing or stable D1  =  0, D2  =  1 when ECB’s 
refinancing rate is increasing. γ is the adjustment coefficient. The estimation 
period is 1999/1–2009/03. 
  The elasticity of changes in market rates on deposit rates (β) is used as a test 
of imperfect competition: Retail bank interest rates in less competitive bank 
market adjust incompletely and only with a delay, while bank interest rates set in 
a fully competitive environment respond quickly and completely. 
 
  β  <  1 is a measure of market power. The closer β is to unity, the more 
competitive banking markets are. 
 
If there is an asymmetric response β1 ≠ β2, and if β1 > β2 retail interest rates are 
more sensitive to decreasing than increasing market rates. And, 
 
  The larger the relative difference (β1 – β2)/β, the less competitive the markets. 
 
 
4.1 Basic  model 
The summary of the regression results of equation (4.1) are presented in Table 
4.1.
12 The model equations explain around 30 to 60 per cent of the variation in the 
bank rate on overnight deposits. For Spain, the correlation coefficient is small, 
only 0.06 indicating clearly different pricing rules in the overnight deposits 
compared to other countries included in the study. The response of overnight 
deposit rates to a 100 basis points change in Euribor varies from 7 to 23 basis 
points. The estimated β-coefficients are all at least within the 95% confidence 
                                                 
12 Detailed regression results are available from the author.  
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level. The smallest response is in Spain, where banks take from a change of 100 
basis points in market rates only 7 bps on board to deposit rates. Respectively, in 
Italy the pass-through is 23 bps to deposit rates. The average reaction in the euro 
area is 8.5 basis points given a 100 bps change in market rates. The lagged 
endogenous variable does not seem to be particularly important: in two cases out 
of six it is not significant and in three cases it is significant only at the 10 per cent 
level. In Germany it is highly significant. The constant α does not diverge 
statistically from zero in any of the cases indicating that there is not a trend factor. 
 
Table 4.1  Summary table of the regressions results 
      from the basic model 
 
Region  β  γ  R
2 DW 
Austria 0.159**  0.160*  0.31  2.42 
Finland 0.155***  0.150*  0.32  2.52 
Germany  0.107*** 0.456*** 0.57  2.60 
Italy 0.226***  0.137*  0.62  2.74 
Spain 0.066***  -0.103  0.06  2.16 
Euro Area  0.085**  0.246  0.27  2.45 
Note: OLS-estimation of equation  ' r ' r ' ' r t ) 1 t ( i d t ) t ( i d ε + Δ γ + Δ β + α = Δ
−  with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. One, two and three asterisks indicate a 
level of significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. N = 121. 
 
 
In the light of the estimation results, it seems obvious that banks exercise market 
power in the markets of household overnight deposits in the countries included as 
well as in the euro area as a whole.
13 All estimated β-coefficients differ 
significantly from one tested with the Wald-test. Market power exercised by the 
banks seems to be most evident in Spain and Germany (Figure 4.1). On the other 
hand, deposit rates react more flexible in Italy, Austria and Finland indicating 
more competitive banking markets.  
 
                                                 
13 The data quality might not be at the same level for the whole euro area as for individual 
countries included in the estimations.  
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Figure 4.1  Estimated responses of deposit interest rates 





Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) have estimated their model also in a discrete-
time form for US individual bank data for money market deposit accounts 
(MMDA) and for Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal (NOW). The estimated 
immediate response is especially low and significant only in 16 per cent of the 
cases (244) for NOW accounts, while the beta for MMDA is larger and significant 
in 94 per cent of the cases (216). The time period covers the years from 1984 to 
1991. 
  The results presented above are in line with Gropp et al (2007). They 
investigate the price setting behaviour of banks in euro area countries by 
estimating the dynamic adjustment of bank spreads for various bank loan and 
deposit categories to changes in market rates as a function of various exogenous 
factors in 1994–2004. Using a panel estimation technique, they find that the 
response of overnight deposit rates to changes in market rates after one quarter is 
less than 20%. In the longer term, after six months, the response is still around 
25%. In a previous study at the euro area level, de Bondt (2002) found the 
response of overnight rates even less incomplete; in the short run about 4% and 
even in the longer run less than 20%. 
 
 
4.2 Asymmetric  response 
The summary of results of estimation the equation (4.2) is collected to Table 4.2. 
The results indicate asymmetry in overnight deposit pricing. Depending on the 
stance of the monetary policy (ECB’s policy rates decreasing, stable or 
increasing), banks price overnight deposits differently. When the monetary policy 
has been easing or stayed liberal, the response of deposit rates to changes in 
market rates is significantly larger than in the period of increasing policy rates. β1  
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is significantly larger than β2 in all cases except Italy.
14 In addition to Italian 
banks Finnish and Germany banks show some responses of overnight interest 
rates also to increasing market rates. The estimation results are also more solid 
measured with adjusted R
2. The lagged endogenous variable loses further its 
explanatory power compared to previous results. 
 
Table 4.2  Summary table of the asymmetric estimation 




+  γ* (β1–β2)β  R
2 DW 
Austria  0.249*** -0.007  0.126 1.61  0.42  2.30 
Finland  0.220*** 0.053  0.100 1.08  0.37  2.48 
Germany  0.142*** 0.046  0.428*** 0.90  0.60  2.53 
Italy 0.255***  0.179***  0.113  0.34  0.63  2.64 
Spain  0.101*** -0.008  -0.082 1.66  0.10  2.06 
Euro area  0.149*** -0.035  0.230 2.16  0.38  2.18 
Note: OLS-estimation of equation 
*
t ) 1 t ( i d
*
t 2 t 1
*
) t ( i d r r 2 D r 1 D r ε + Δ γ + Δ β + Δ β + α =
−  with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. One, two and three asterisks indicate a 
level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. H0: β1 = β2 tested with Wald test. The 
cases where β1
– is statistically significantly larger than β2
+ are denoted with bold markings. 
N = 121. 
 
 
Having such an asymmetry in deposit pricing raises an interesting question about 
the long run behaviour of the mark up between market rates and overnight deposit 
interest rates. For example a series of decreasing market rates would produce 
cumulatively higher margins, which conflicts with the basic equilibrium concept. 
Thus there must be some long-term counter forces which will restore the 
equilibrium. Since the purpose of model used in this study is to reveal the short 
term responses of the deposit rates, the mechanism for restoring the balance is left 
out of this study.
15 
  Figure 4.2 shows the combination of the estimation results of eqs (4.1) and 
(4.2) where the relative difference (β1 – β2)/β is plotted against the original β. 
  The scatter diagram gives us a slightly different account of the relative 
situation of countries included. The deposit rates are most flexible in Italy and less 
flexible in Spain as in previous case, but market power measured as relative 
difference of asymmetric pricing Austrian banks seem to have used market power 
more than eg German or Finnish banks. 
 
                                                 
14 The differences as indicated by the Wald test are statistically significant at 95% confidence 
level. 
15 Peltzman (2000) has a discussion about the issue.  
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Figure 4.2  Deposit rate responses and relative differences 





Comparing to some previous empirical country studies in the euro area these 
results are in line. Lago-Gonzáles and Salas-Fumás (2005) concluded that there is 
substantial and asymmetric rigidity in Spanish deposit rates in relation to market 
rates. Their analysis was based on bank level data over the years 1988–2003. 
Gambarcorta and Iannotti (2005) found for Italian part that the introduction of 
Consolidated Law on Banking in 1993, which fostered competition in banking, 
accelerated noteworthy the speed of adjustment and reduced the asymmetric 
behaviour of deposit rates. Their study covered the years 1985–2002. 
  Summarizing the results from the estimations give us the following 
conclusions: 
 
(i)  Households’ overnight deposit responses to changes in competitive market 
rates vary from 7 to 23 basis points if market rate change100 basis points. 
Most flexible interest rates are in Italy and most rigid in Spain. 
(ii) Deposit  interest  rates  responses are significantly asymmetric in the countries 
investigated except Italy, where banks react both to increasing and 
decreasing market rates symmetrically. 
(ii)  Assuming only a symmetric reaction might be misleading, while the 
response can be only due to banks’ reactions to decreasing market rates. A 
large coefficient (elasticity) for the market rate does not in that case indicate  
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a competitive banking market but instead less competition and more market 
power.
16 
(iii)  Taking the asymmetry into account, in addition to Italy, most competitive 
banking in the households overnight deposit markets seems to be in Finland 
and Germany. In Italy, banks deposit rates elasticity to increasing market 
rates has been around 0.18 and in Finland and Germany around 0.05. In 
Spain and Austria deposit rates have not reacted to increasing market rates. 
(iv)  In the euro area as a whole, the retail overnight deposit rates for households 
seem to be very rigid and strongly asymmetric. Thus on the average banks 
seem to exercise significant market power measured with deposit pricing. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness  checks 
A number of robustness checks were undertaking to ensure the consistency of the 
results. To check the effect of rather limited amount of observations per country, 
panel estimation was run over the whole sample. These results support quite well 
the country estimations. 
  Next the equation (4.1) was estimated for different monetary policy regimes 
to check the robustness of the non-linear estimates. The whole period was divided 
into four sub-periods with increasing, decreasing or stable interest rates. These 
regressions clearly confirmed the asymmetric pricing behaviour. Overnight 
interest rates followed the increasing market rates only slightly or not at all but 
decreasing market rates were followed undoubtedly. Banks behaviour seems to be 
surprisingly systematic in all countries included. 
  The estimations were run also for all euro area countries for 2003–2009, since 
the harmonised data for overnight deposits are available for the whole euro area 
since 2003. The results are shown in Appendix, Table A1.1. The results for 
countries not included in the basic estimations indicated also strong asymmetry. 
The highest response in overnight deposits to changes in market rate was found in 
Luxembourg following Ireland which is well in line with the common opinion of 
highly competitive banking markets in those countries. Overnight interest rates 
are especially rigid in France and Portugal in addition to Spain, indicating 
different pricing principles for overnight interest rates in those countries. 
  However, the estimation period is still short and there are only few 
observations to distinguish the asymmetric reactions so these results are only 
tentative and require more than usual reservations. 
 
                                                 
16 The same reservation must be made when commenting the pass-through of policy rates to retail 




This paper has investigated the possibility to measure the market power of euro 
area banks using a partial adjustment model where households’ overnight deposit 
interest rates are modelled as a function of corresponding market interest rate. The 
results showed that banks exercise market power when pricing these overnight 
deposits. The banks’ behaviour was strengthened when asymmetric pricing was 
included into the model. Overnight deposit rates seem to be much more flexible 
when monetary policy was eased or stayed stable compared to increasing interest 
rates regime. Banks transform only a limed amount of increasing interest rates to 
overnight deposit rates. Even if the banks behaviour was observed to have 
systematically similar features in all countries included, differences are still, 
however, noteworthy across euro area member countries. 
  The results of this study suggest, in line with the theoretical literature, that 
banks use the pricing power in the markets for short term deposits. The results 
show also that it is possible to get a rough estimate of the market power using a 
simple partial adjustment model. There are, however, many possibilities to expand 
the model. The deposit pricing of the banks is depended in addition to competitive 
market rates on costs to switch banking account, on the bundling of banking 
services and on competitive nature of the banking markets. Controlling the 
impacts of these factors the results might be improved. To study the pricing of 
other deposit accounts in the standpoint from competition would, of course, be 
interesting. 
  In terms of policy implications, the relationship between banking competition 
and financial stability is of highly relevance. At the retail level, as studied in this 
paper, despite of modern banking practices, market power is still a concern. Price 
rigidities are clearly observable in deposit markets and competition policy has an 
active role to play. An interesting test of flexibility in deposit interest rates is 
coming when the recovery from the current crises starts and a regime shift in 
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Appendix 
Table A1.1  Regression results for 12 euro area member 
     countries  2003/1–2009/3 
 
Region  β  β1
–  β2
+  γ  R
2 DW 
Austria 0.181**      0.080  0.33  2.48 
   0.258** -0.022  0.035 0.43  2.31 
Belgium 0.086***      0.152  0.30  2.08 
   0.102***  0.047  0.131  0.31  2.03 
Finland 0.157**      0.232*  0.46  2.56 
   0.226** 0.017  0.142 0.55  2.57 
France 0.009     -0.450***  0.19  2.21 
   0.005  0.020  -0.452***  0.18  2.18 
Germany 0.092***      0.504***  0.56  2.61 
   0.125*** 0.011  0.457*** 0.59 2.56 
Greece 0.079***      0.394* 0.34  2.22 
   0.092**  0.041  0.383*  0.34  2.20 
Ireland 0.193***      0.159  0.48  2.07 
   0.249*** 0.067  0.110 0.53  1.87 
Italy 0.149***      0.442***  0.76  2.65 
   0.182*** 0.072*** 0.392*** 0.79 2.60 
Luxembourg 0.264***      0.370*** 0.60 2.46 
   0.350*** 0.078  0.309*** 0.64 2.39 
Netherlands 0.066      -0.048  0.35  2.19 
   0.068***  0.060***  -0.057  0.35  2.16 
Portugal 0.039      -0.251*  0.12  2.27 
   0.058 -0.015 -0.253 0.16  2.33 
Spain 0.046***      0.142  0.12  2.05 
   0.059***  0.012  0.139*  0.16  1.99 
Euro area  0.074***      0.552***  0.74  2.51 
   0.100*** 0.010  0.501*** 0.78 2.43 
Note: OLS-estimation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors & covariance. One, two and three asterisks indicate a level of significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. H0:  β1 = β2 tested with Wald test. The cases where β1
– is 
statistically significantly larger than β2
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